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Qualified Majority versus Unanimity: Making Decisions Easier? 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we will investigate if there is the counterintuitive possibility that 
decisions under unanimity in the Council of the European Union may result in approval of 
proposals of the Commission with higher simplicity when compared to the voting system of 
qualified majority. The focus will be not only on the underlying interpretation of the 
abstention, but also on the quorum required to allow formal voting to take place. Moreover, 
bearing in mind different interpretations of abstention, we will also find the necessary 
proportion of favorable actual voters for each level of participation to ensure that the concepts 
of Condorcet Consistency and Representation are respected.  
















The main bodies of the legislative process in the European Union are the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (also called the Council of the European 
Union). According to the ordinary legislative procedure used in nearly 80% of the legislation, 
the Council of Ministers legislates with the European Parliament after a proposal by the 
Commission. In this procedure, for an act to be approved, the favorable vote of the two 
institutions is needed. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers is the most important legislative 
of the European Union, since there are some decision processes in which it is the only 
institution with power to legislate. 
There are three voting decision methods in the Council of Ministers: simple majority, 
qualified majority and unanimity. However, we could consider that only two methods are 
relevant since simple majority is only used for procedural questions for requesting the 
elaboration of studies from the European Commission. Decisions that imply the adoption of 
new legislation in the European countries are voted by either qualified majority or unanimity. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty, qualified majority shall be the main decision rule to approve 
legislation originated by the European Commission in accordance to a provision in article 3.  
The current dispositions of qualified majority imply that for the approval of a proposal two 
requirements must be satisfied and so it is also called the double majority once it requires 
that the minimum of favorable votes must be equal to 55% of the Members and those positive 
votes need to represent also 65% of the total population in the European Union. For a 
blocking minority to be constituted this one should be composed by at least four countries 
which have to represent at least 35% of the total of the European Population. There is also 
the possibility for the Member-States to use the qualified majority criteria that was agreed 
under the Nice Treaty in 2001 until March of 2017 in which the voting weights attributed to 
the countries seemed to reflect the population of the countries but they also reflect political 
and bargaining power. The quota imposed for an approval of a decision was set to 260 votes 
in a total of 352 and it was additionally required that a simple majority of countries should 
vote for the proposal. However, this method had a special caveat: a Member State could 
request confirmation that the positive votes represent 62% of the European Population. Since 
the request depends on the initiative of a Member State, then it is possible that some decisions 
could be approved even though this condition is not fulfilled.  
The other decision rule for the approval of a decision is the voting rule of unanimity. This 
voting decision is reserved for critical questions considered too sensitive for the countries in 
the sense that it affects their sovereignty, such as harmonization of taxation across countries, 
common and foreign policy or justice and home affairs.  
In the past, unanimity was the decision rule used to approve legislation in the European 
Union. The Treaty of Rome predicted that over time, decisions should be made by qualified 
majority instead of unanimity. However, in 1965, French President Charles de Gaulle was 
against some proposals that would be approved under qualified majority with the opposing 
vote of France. In this situation, France would have to apply measures it did not approve in 
the national law. Charles de Gaulle was not a true supporter of the European idea and as a 
reaction he started not attending the meetings, creating the “crisis of the empty chair” and 
also threatened the other Members with the possibility that France would exit the European 
Economic Community. This generated a climate of tension among the 6 original members. 
Since France was an important Member of the Community, the other countries accepted the 
French requests and so the Luxembourg Compromise was signed. This stated that if a 
decision made by a majority threatens another Member-State in vital interests, then the 
countries should engage in negotiations to achieve a solution upon which all Members can 
agree. Even though the Luxembourg Compromise did not have binding force, it had a 
significant impact on decision-making in the Community since for an approval of a decision, 
unanimity was required. Only with the signature of the European Single Act in 1986 would 
qualified majority become the main voting method for the approval of decisions within the 
Community. According to Richard Baldwin and Charles Wyplsoz (2009), the Luxembourg 
Compromise reduced the ability of the Community to approve decisions and the problem 
would only be aggravated when the first enlargement of the Community took place in 1973 
to include three new members. Although the voting mechanism of unanimity is more rigid 
since approval requires the consent of all members, we cannot blame only unanimity for the 
slowness of the decision-making of the Community. In fact, the period of 1973 until 1986 
was known as the Euro-Pessimism period. During this period, European economies would 
suffer from the adverse economic shocks that took place: the increase in the oil prices caused 
supply shocks that originated an increase in the inflation rates as well as an increase in the 
unemployment rates. Is it not possible that the slowness of the Community decisions can also 
be attributed to the fact that ministers were more worried about solving their domestic 
problems and the European project became a secondary concern? Moreover, the threat of the 
French President to exit the Community could cause the end of the Economic Community - 
or at least weaken its original and main purpose to avoid a new war between Germany and 
France. To consolidate this argument, according to Gollub (1999), the speed of approval of 
new legislation did not rise after the signature of the European Single Act in 1986.  
Thus, there is the need to clarify if the voting decision of qualified majority always produces 
a voting outcome that results in an approval rate of decisions that is higher than the voting 
decision of unanimity.  The first main difference in the voting systems consists in the role 
that abstention can play. In fact, there are three alternatives for representatives to vote on the 
adoption of a proposal: “yes”, “no” or “abstaining”. Nevertheless, abstention has different 
interpretations according to the voting system, since in qualified majority an abstention is 
equivalent to a no vote, while in unanimity abstentions do not prevent a decision from being 
adopted. This could open a possibility for situation in which a proposal could be rejected 




Figure1: Possible Voting Configuration leading to different outcome voting result. Let 
us imagine that the European Union is composed of 7 countries. If there at least four 
abstentions and in the absence of an explicit no vote, then a decision would be approved 
under unanimity but not in qualified (or simple) majority since there are more abstentions 
than positive votes. All the voting configurations without a negative vote and with more 
than 3 representatives choosing to abstain will lead to a proposal to fail under majority 
while it would pass under unanimity.  
The abstention we refer to in the previous paragraph is an option available for the member-
states representatives at the moment of voting. However, representatives have also the 
possibility of not attending the meetings. The current procedure rules state that a vote is only 
taken when there is a majority of the member-states representatives present at the meeting 
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(equal to at least 15 ministers). However, a minister who attends the meeting can also 
represent the position of a missing representative but he/she can represent at most one absent 
country. Ignoring this possibility, then the quorum imposed would never be a binding 
condition under qualified majority, since in any case approval under qualified majority 
requires the positive vote of at least 16 member-states. Nonetheless, the situation changes 
when the voting rule is unanimity since if the minimum of representatives is met, there is no 
requirement regarding positive votes. Therefore, we say that under qualified majority, there 
is a quorum of majority while in unanimity there is a quorum of participation. This 
characteristic can also provide a potential reason for unanimity to generate a higher approval.  
Moreover, there is also the need to understand whether the voting rules satisfies the 
requirements of the Condorcet criterion. In a binary-choice referendum, the Condorcet 
principle consists in selecting the alternative which defeats the other with simple majority 
and so it corresponds to the will of the majority. If this condition does not hold, then what 
rule and which thresholds should be used to satisfy the fact that European Union is a mix of 
two realities: a Union of States and a Federal State.  
2. Literature Review  
The literature concerning the decision making process in the European Council is vast. Every 
time that there is a new enlargement of the European Union or a change  in the voting 
mechanisms such as new rules for qualified majority voting, there is a series of papers making 
reference to the voting powers of the representatives of the diverse countries in an attempt to 
verify who are the losers and the winners of the change in the voting rule, as well to verify if 
the introduction of the new rules are able to generate an outcome that promotes fairness in 
terms of distribution of voting weights. The definition of fairness criteria is not simple or 
consensual, but nevertheless, there is the attempt of the European Union to design an 
mechanism close to the principle “One Person, One Vote”, in which every citizen in the 
Union has the same rights; but at the same time, there is also the concern that the process of 
decision making is such that the smallest States can also have a word in the final decision 
and this is called the principle of “One State, One Vote”.   
The non-normalized Penrose-Banzhaf power index power is one of the many power indices 
and it can be expressed as the proportion of all vote configurations that are swings. A swing 
for member i consists in a vote configuration where the total votes in favor allow for the 
approval of a proposal, but without the favorable vote of the member i then the decision will 
be rejected. Following the notation of Leech (2002) if the total number of swings for a 
representative for a representative i is given by 𝜂𝑖, the non-normalized Banzhaf-Penrose 
index for a representative i can be given by 𝜋𝑖 =
𝜂𝑖
2𝑛−1
. The denominator consists in the 
maximum number of swings for a representative i since it considers all possible vote 
configurations considering that i is not included. This index was used in the work of Aziz H 
and Leech D (2007) to analyze the qualified majority stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon,  and 
with resource to the Gini coefficient of citizen power to measure the inequality, they 
concluded that the double majority is actually more unequal than the triple majority present 
in the Nice Treaty (2001), although that in respect to the Coleman power to act ( defined as 
the proportion of the vote configurations allowing for the approval of a proposal)  there is an 
improvement. The final conclusion is that the Penrose Square Root Law is the one able to 
achieve equal power to all the citizens. The Penrose Square Root Law consists in attributing 
voting weights to the representatives such that the non-normalized Banzhaf-Penrose index is 
proportional to the square root of the population of his/her country of origin.  
Nevertheless, the use of the voting power theory to characterize the decision making process 
of the European Union is not devoid of criticism. According to Garret and Tsebelis (1999), 
the use of voting power indices is not correct since it is based on a priori voting decisions in 
which the probability of a representative to vote for or against the proposal is the same and 
so it ignores the policy preferences of the actors involved in the decision making process; the 
institutional rules are also disregarded and most important it does not consider that the 
representatives might behave strategically. This last assumption is quite important since 
according to the functioning of the Council, there is bargaining among the agents and given 
some proposals that are fundamental to some Member States, those representatives might 
have incentive to persuade other representatives so that they can approve a proposal in 
exchange for a favorable vote in other proposal. This behavior is likely to occur since there 
are several meetings along a year and so along time, ministers learn each other’s preferences.  
In response to this criticism, there is an attempt to incorporate some features of the 
institutional framework of the European Union. In the work of Laruelle, Martínez and 
Valenciano (2004), the authors computed the Penrose-Banzhaf  considering that the vote 
configurations that do not have at least half of the members supporting the proposal have a 
probability equal to zero whereas the vote configurations that fulfill this assumption have all 
the same probability. This assumption is built on the evidence that the Commission only 
makes a proposal when it has evidence that its approval has a minimum support which is 
guaranteed. If one relies on voting power theory, then one can conclude that decisions under 
unanimity become more difficult as the number of countries in the Union increases, once 
there is only one vote configuration under unanimity that leads to the approval of a decision. 
According to Heisenberg (2005), consensus can be a more efficient mechanism than qualified 
majority voting since a Member-State representative in order to find support for a given 
proposal which is favorable for him/her, he/she needs to meet the demand of another Member 
in another area giving origin to another legislative act. Therefore, this demand for support 
can give origin to a supply of proposals that could not exist if the decision voting was 
qualified majority, once if a particular Member-State is not required to form a winning 
coalition, then its preferences would be disregarded and that exchange would not exist. Under 
qualified majority, there would only exist incentives for the Member-States that have the 
power of forming the winning coalitions to reach agreements between them.  
At a first glance, it seems that there are three alternatives in which a representative can choose 
under the voting system of unanimity. However, with a closer inspection, one can conclude 
that the value of abstention under unanimity is a positive vote. Therefore, it is not the case 
that abstention is a third alternative under the Council and so there is no possibility of 
applying ternary games, a point mentioned by Felsenthal and Machover (1997). Thus, one 
may simply ask the purpose of the abstention and the reasons for its existence, which may 
help understand what its interpretation should be.   
The analysis concerning the fact that an outcome of a voting decision mechanism satisfies 
the principles of Condorcet Consistency (consistency with the preferences of the majority of 
potential voters) and Representation (coincidence of the outcomes if abstainers also voted) 
is based on the approach elaborated by Côrte-Real and Pereira (2002) which showed that the 
imposition of a quorum condition, requiring for instance that the number of actual voters 
corresponds at least to half of the total number of total voters,  in addition to the condition of 
simple majority in order to occur a change in the law in opposing the status quo, creates a 
dilemma for the supporters of ‘no’, once by voting they contribute to the satisfaction of the 
quorum while if they decide to abstain, the ‘yes’ voters might defeat the ‘no’ and also satisfy 
the quorum imposition. The authors showed that the concern in achieving an outcome that is 
representative of the will of the whole population leads to a result in which it is impossible 
to satisfy three criteria: Condorcet Consistency, Independence of the preferences of the 
abstainers and Representation without imposing a specific interpretation on the agents who 
decide to abstain.  
3. Discussion  
3.1 On the role of Abstention  
In both unanimity and qualified majority, abstention is not different from a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote 
(respectively). We are therefore in the presence of simple games and so the Condorcet-Arrow 
problems of manipulation are not present, and so a simple majority is enough to select the 
Condorcet winner. Nevertheless, it might occur that a change in the voting decision would 
lead to a different outcome if there are many abstentions and no negative explicit votes. In 
that situation a change in the voting decision from qualified majority to a unanimity decision 
rule would lead to an approval of a decision. However, one must also ask if this is a feasible 
situation that can occur in reality. At a first glance, one should not expect this type of situation 
since Member-States representatives are in principle aware of the meaning of abstention in 
each case and so one should expect not to see a large set of abstentions (since this type of 
vote is not a third option) and so it follows that the final decisions under the European Council 
of Ministers should be bipolarized between ‘no’ and ‘yes’ votes. However, abstentions occur 
more often than one whould expect: according to the Van Gruisen and Crombez (2016) 
between the period of 2004 and 2014, 367 acts were contested either by abstention or by ‘no’ 
vote. Why does this occur? The explanations of the role of the abstention are quite obscure.  
Novak (2013) argues that a vote against or an abstention needs to be clarified in the process 
of decision-making. Moreover this type of votes attracts public attention. When a minister 
considers that he/she has an interest in publicly dissenting, he/she will vote ‘no’. However, 
when he/she wants to express public dissatisfaction with a measure, but wants to maintain 
good relations with the institutions, he/she may choose to abstain or draft a formal statement. 
The purpose of the author is to make the explicit point that the culture of consensus in the 
Council is not equivalent to unanimity. According to the author, the publication of the formal 
votes is an extra reason for the ministers to remain in silence. Therefore, there is a culture of 
blame in the Council that explains the low numbers of opposing votes.  
Aken (2012) argues that under unanimity, an abstention indicates that a Member-State is not 
entirely satisfied with the measure but does not want to block the majority decision. He also 
points out that new Member-States prefer to use an abstention to show disagreement while 
the older Member-States prefer to use a ‘no’ vote. Moreover, if there are few “no” votes, it 
would be possible to change those votes to “yes” through voting exchange. Hayes-Renshaw 
(2006) and Novak (2011) also mention that contesting Member-States might decide to drop 
their opposition once a clear majority has been established. The possible reason might be the 
high costs involved in the short and long run of continuous opposition.  
Zbíral (2008) argues that under unanimity, the use of the veto power is limited by informal 
rules, for instance it is difficult for just one country to use its veto power against a 
compromise already achieved by the other Member-States. In fact, we can say that this 
situation has occurred recently: the Belgian region of Wallonia was opposing the Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and Canada. After a few days and upon the 
conclusion that all the remaining member-states would be in agreement regarding this issue, 
this region also decided not to block it. In this type of situation, one could argue that 
unanimity does not lead to the Pareto Frontier outcome, since the political influence of some 
member-states representatives and negotiation costs can lead other representatives to end up 
in a situation in which they accept a position that is not favorable for them. Under qualified 
majority, this author argues that abstention cannot be viewed as a position of indifference 
once according to the informal rules of the Council state that when a representative is an 
situation of indifference, then that representative should vote in favor for the proposal to 
please other Member-States that are in favor of that proposal so that in future negotiations 
that indifferent representative can profit from the fact that it helped other representatives. 
With respect to the question of the existence of abstention, the author mentions that the role 
of abstention should be clarified since abstention and voting against should represent the 
same value, although both are options that lead to different outcomes.  
According to Van Gruisen and Crombez (2016), the difference between the ‘no’ vote and an 
abstention concerns a political message once the ‘no’ vote is taken with a negative 
connotation by the European institutions according to interviews performed by the authors 
to the Permanent Representatives. By recording a statement or abstaining, representatives are 
able to signal their dissatisfaction and at same time not damage the ambition of the Council 
to achieve consensus. This type of behavior is appreciated by the institutions and at a later 
time it might be compensated.  
This leads us to conclude that an abstention would seem to represent disagreement regardless 
of the voting system being used, although unanimity actually considers abstention as a 
positive vote. Thus, under a hypothetical situation in which all countries would choose to 
abstain, a proposal would be approved under unanimity although it might correspond to a 
situation of dissatisfaction among all member-states; such situation in qualified majority 
voting would not occur since it would lead to the refusal of the proposal. In the presence of 
this situation, one can conclude that abstention should not be possible – or at least that the 
rule should be revised to reflect its meaning. Decisions under unanimity might well reflect 
the position of a few Member-States using their political influence but failing to represent 
the will of a majority. 
3.2  The Intergovernmental Criteria  
If one assumes that the European Union should be thought as a political Union constituted 
by several countries, then each representative should have equal power. In this situation, the 
process of decision-making should be constituted by 28 actors in which they would represent 
the view of their national country by voting ‘yes’, ‘no’ or abstaining. With this perspective 
in mind, it is possible to assess the situations in which there is the fulfilment of  Condorcet 
Consistency and Representation. 
In the following part, I will use the notation used by Côrte-Real and Pereira (2002) and so 
one defines N as the set of potential voters and n defined as n=|𝑁|. There are currently 28 
member-states representatives in the Council of the European Union, and so it follows that 
n=28. Of those representatives, let us assume that at the moment of voting, only a fraction of 
those potential voters are present at the moment of voting. Let N’ be the set of actual voters, 
with n’ =|𝑁′|. It follows necessarily from here that N\N’ is interpreted as the set of abstainers 
and the number of agents who decide to abstain is given by. We should note that abstaining 
in the Council of the European Union encompasses two different concepts: those who decide 
to abstain and those who decide to not be present at the meeting. We will assume that both 
types of abstention will be incorporated in the notation used here and so it follows that in N’, 
we are only including agents that will vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Each representative is 
endowed with a rational preference relation on the set of outcomes A={𝑌𝑒𝑠, 𝑁𝑜}. One can 
also denote the preference profile of the electorate who votes by 𝑅𝑁′ = (𝑅𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁′   and the 
preference profile of those who abstain by 𝑅𝑁\𝑁′ = (𝑅𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁\𝑁′  . Now, we will introduce the 
notation which is essential to ensure that the outcome of a voting system satisfies the concepts 
of Condorcet Consistency and Representation and in order to proceed, we express the concept 
of which represents the proportion of voters in N’ who are favorable as 𝛽 =
|𝑖∈𝑁′∶𝑌𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑁𝑜|
|𝑁′ |
;   
which represents the proportion of the agents in N’ who are indifferent between voting yes 
or no as 𝛾 =
|𝑖∈𝑁′:𝑌𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑖𝑁𝑜|
|𝑁′|
. We will assume that half of those who are indifferent will vote 




represents the fraction of the voters in N’ who vote for no. On the set of abstainers, we shall 
define n-n’ to represent the fraction of the voters in the set of N\N’ that support a favorable 
decision represented by 𝛼 =
|𝑖∈𝑁\𝑁’∶𝑌𝑒𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑁𝑜|
|𝑁\𝑁′ |
;  denotes the proportion of abstainers who are 
indifferent between a yes or no decision as 𝛿 =
|𝑖∈𝑁\𝑁′:𝑌𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑖𝑁𝑜|
|𝑁\𝑁′|
  and as in the previous case, 
we will assume that half of those indifferent would vote for ‘yes’ while the other half would 
vote for ‘no’. It follows necessarily that 1-α-
𝛿
2
 represents the proportion of the abstainers who 
are totally opposed to a decision. In order to satisfy Condorcet Consistency and 




𝑛′ + 𝛼(𝑛 − 𝑛′) +
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(𝑛 − 𝑛′) ≥ (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾)𝑛′ +
𝛾
2
𝑛′ + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛿)(𝑛 − 𝑛′) +
𝛿
2
(𝑛 − 𝑛′)                                                                                                                                1                                                           
This inequality can be reduced to the following form that expresses  as a function of the 
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Now with the notation required, we can analyze the first disposition of the qualified majority 
voting scheme with respect to the criteria of the minimum number of member-states 
representative necessary to vote favorably. The imposition of a minimum number of 16 
representatives means that this could be considered not as a voting threshold but as majority 






≥ 𝜃 in which 𝜃  is a constant necessary for 
the approval of a decision. The approval condition requires that. It becomes necessary, thus, 
to discover the number of actual voters and the proportion of favorable voters that would 
satisfy the criteria above mentioned. Nevertheless, this will depend on the imposition of 
specific values on the parameters. 
 What assumptions could be made on the value of the parameters? The evidence above 
showed that an abstention is essentially a ‘no’ vote. Moreover, we can assume that countries 
which strongly support the decision will obviously voting ‘yes’ and will be present at the 
meeting in order to show to the Commission their goodwill so that they could benefit from 
future concessions in the future. Therefore, in this light of analysis, we can set the value of α 
to be 0. Concerning the value of the proportion of indifferent voters in the set of actual voters, 
we can say that this parameter will be such that  ∈ [0;
1
2
[ . We should remember that the 
Commission takes into the account the Council’s positions regarding a future proposal and it 
does so by ensuring that the proposal that would be sent to the Council gets at enough half 
of positive votes of the member-states representatives and so based on this we should not 
assume that the proportion of indifferent actual voters is greater than one half. Finally, 
concerning the value of the parameter  which is related to the proportion of indifferent voters 
in the abstainers, we could assume that:𝛿 ∈ [0; 1], since it would make sense for indifferent 
voters to avoid participating in the vote but the same cannot be said of representatives with 
strict preferences. In any case, based on previous history of votes, we do not expect many 
countries not to attend a meeting. Since the values of can take values on an interval range, 
















Table 1: Values of the parameters 






  and since the maximum value that 
 can take is equal to ½, the minimum value that n’ can take is equal to 16, 8. In this case, a 
decision of unanimity with 14 elements even if all of them vote favorably would not respect 
Condorcet Consistency and Representation. 
 
Graph 1: Proportion of actual voters voting positively in order to ensure Condorcet 







When the values of the parameters  and  are equal such that =, the resulting optimal 






.For instance, when 𝛾 =
1
2
 , due to our behavioral assumption that half of those would 
vote positively and the other half would vote negatively, then this means that the minimum 
number of member-states representatives to be on the meeting will reduced to 14, a case of 























Figure 2: Proportion of actual voters voting positively in order to ensure Condorcet 







There is one particular case in which to ensure the Condorcet Consistency and 
Representation, it is not necessary a higher rate of approval when few representatives attend 
the meeting which occurs when 𝛿 = 1 , which means that all agents who decide to abstain 
are indifferent and in this particular case due to the assumption that half of those agents would 
vote positively while the other half would vote negatively, then if a vote would be restricted 
to those agents, there would be a tie and so the final outcome would be decided by those 
agents who would decide to appear in the meeting. Provided that the proportion of favorable 
votes is above a certain critical value, the two criteria would be fulfilled regardless of the 
number of agents who appeared in the meeting. In this case, then the proportion of indifferent 
voters will determine the necessary proportion of favorable votes so that both criteria would 















Finally, when 𝛾 = 𝛿 = 0  by inequality 2 the optimal system would be a majority threshold 






. If we accept this more restrictive assumption, then 
it follows that the threshold of the qualified majority should be lowered to 
1
 2
. Since this 
assumption implies the tightest restriction on the values of parameters, this is the most 
pessimistic scenario and so it should be the benchmark for the designing of the optimal voting 
system.  
If we relax the behavioral assumption made in case of indifference at the meeting and instead 
consider that all the indifferent voters would vote positively, then instead of the inequality 2, 
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we compare this assumption with the previous behavioral assumption, we will conclude that 
the number of representatives necessary to be on the meeting to ensure the satisfaction of the 
criteria will be lower when compared to the previous case since we are not splitting the 
indifferent voters.  
3.3 The Problem of the Population Threshold  
With respect to the population criterion, one shall note that in the Council, the population 
does not vote directly and so the representative of the country is the one in charge of deciding 
on the allocation of the vote of the country and thus by deciding to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in the 
context of the voting system, it would be as if all the population of his/her country was voting 
favorably or negatively. Nevertheless, one could imagine the proposals of the Commission 
being subject to a hypothetical referendum system in which the population would be called 
upon to vote. In that situation, the criteria of the population could be interpreted as a majority 
threshold condition in which a change defeats the status quo if the proportion of the actual 
votes for “Yes” in the population exceeds the threshold imposed for a change which 
according to the rules of the Council is set to be equal to 65%. In terms of the model, this 








> 0,65. However, n now means the total population in 
millions and n’ means the cardinality of the set of voters (in millions). Based on the last 
European election, the turnout was 42, 61% in a universe of nearly 400 million of Europeans 
eligible for voting. Therefore, 170, 44 million went to vote and so this means that in order 
for a decision to pass with the existing majority threshold, the value of  would have to be 
greater than 1 which would render all the decisions impossible. Consequently, this criteria 
would need to be reformulated based on the values of the parameters. In this case, making 
restrictions on the value of the parameter  is more difficult and so unless otherwise stated 
we will assume that =0.  
 If we assume that all the agents who decide to abstain are indifferent regarding the role of 
the European Union and its proposals it could be justified that =1  so that all the abstainers 
would be indifferent and by the behavioral assumption adopted, half of them would vote for 
yes and the other half would vote no. Given this hypothesis, the optimal referendum design 
would be one such that it would be required that half of the actual voters to be favorable to 
approve a proposal. 
However, contrary to the previous analysis in which α=0, now we could assume that a 
scenario such that  𝛼 =
1
3
;  𝛿 =
1
2







. Assuming the turnout which was registered in the European elections, it 
was necessary an approval rate of nearly 39%. A more conservative approach in which the 
values of α and  are lower such that: α =
1
5
;  𝛿 =
1
4







. In this case, assuming the turnout of the last election it would be required 
a higher  of nearly 74%. With these two examples, it follows that the proportion of favorable 
votes will not be given by a single fixed value. 
The current dispositions of the qualified majority voting by not allowing that a country might 
divide its votes between yes and no votes actually fails to ensure that the majority of the 
population of the Union is actually in favor, since the requirement of a representative to cast 
all of its votes in one direction ends up in a position in which there is not representation for 
the population of that country, a scenario that finds parallel with the current American 
presidential election system, in which the winner did not win the popular vote, since the 
design of the system is based on plurality voting for each state and so representation is lost. 
At best, the majority of the population is in favor. The argument that countries with most 
population should have higher power indices is therefore mistaken if representation is the 
main concern.  
4. Conclusion  
The rules of procedure in the Council of the European Union allow for the possibility that a 
decision under unanimity could lead to an approval of a decision that would not be approved 
under qualified majority if the minimum number of representatives on the meeting is met and 
many chose to abstain. Nevertheless, under the research made, it was possible to conclude 
that even though abstention is interpreted as a ‘yes’ vote under unanimity, the value of an 
abstention is the same under both voting systems and should be equivalent to a ‘no’ vote. 
Consequently, decisions that would eventually be approved under unanimity with more 
abstentions than favorable votes do not respect Condorcet Consistency and Representation. 
The analysis performed allowed to find that the requirements of the qualified majority voting 
system find a parallel in a referendum voting scheme that would correspond to a majority 
threshold condition in which it is required that the proportion of favorable votes would 
exceed a certain constant.  
If the European Union is considered as a political Union and each representative represents 
the majority of the opinion on its country of origin, then by imposing restrictions on the 
preferences of those agents who decide to abstain and assuming that voting abstaining is 
equivalent to a no vote, there will be a relationship between the proportion of favorable votes 
and the number of voters who decided to attend the meeting which in general will correspond 
to a negative slope function. Nevertheless, if one assumes that those who do not attend a 
meeting are all indifferent about the decision, then the satisfaction of the criteria would be 
ensured by any number of voters attending the meeting provided that the proportion of 
favorable votes is above a certain threshold determined by the proportion of indifferent voters 
that attend the meeting. Therefore, assumptions on the parameters will lead to different 
optimal systems. In this case, understanding the position of the actual indifferent voters 
becomes essential since it will convert into automatically actual “yes” or “no” votes, which 
then will imply different systems.  
 Regarding the population criteria, there is at least three remarks: as in the case of the 
condition of the majority of the states, there is no respect for the satisfaction of the three 
criteria. Moreover, in a hypothetical referendum, we conclude that the quota imposed would 
never be achieved since the turnout of the European elections is low and so if this criterion 
was designed to somewhat reflect the will of the people, then we would conclude that no 
decision would be approved, which would cause a gridlock in the process of decision-
making. Finally, the plurality condition in which representatives put all the votes in just one 
option leads to a failure of representation of the will of the population since this would imply 
that all the population of one country is in favor or it is against.  
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